University of Minnesota Law School
Scholarship Repository
Minnesota Journal of International Law

2018

War Aims Matter: Keeping Jus Contra Bellum
Restrictive While Requiring the Articulation of the
Goals of the Use of Force
Jens Iverson

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.umn.edu/mjil
Part of the Law Commons
Recommended Citation
Iverson, Jens, "War Aims Matter: Keeping Jus Contra Bellum Restrictive While Requiring the Articulation of the Goals of the Use of
Force" (2018). Minnesota Journal of International Law. 356.
https://scholarship.law.umn.edu/mjil/356

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the University of Minnesota Law School. It has been accepted for inclusion in Minnesota
Journal of International Law collection by an authorized administrator of the Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact
lenzx009@umn.edu.

Symposium Article
War Aims Matter: Keeping Jus Contra Bellum
Restrictive While Requiring the Articulation of
the Goals of the Use of Force
Jens Iverson
Abstract
Should planned humanitarian interventions be required to
have a well-articulated plan for peace? What has been lost by
reducing the principal justification for the use of force to selfdefense? This article explains why a full articulation of the goals
of the use of force should be required, but why this explanation of
desired ends should not entail a loosening of the limited legal
justifications for the use of force. Jus post bellum is focused on
the successful transition from armed conflict to peace. The
success of this effort begins with the formation and declaration of
war aims, not with steps taken after cessation of hostilities. A
review of recent international armed conflicts in Kuwait, Kosovo,
Afghanistan, Iraq, Libya, Ukraine, and elsewhere, underscores
the connection between the articulation of war aims and the
quality of the resulting peace. The customary law on declarations
of war and peacemaking are examined, as well as current law
rooted in the United Nations Charter.
The articulation of war aims matters not only for jus post
bellum, but for the prevention of war and for jus in bello as well.

Assistant Professor of Law, Ph.D., J.D., Grotius Centre for
International Legal Studies, Law Faculty, Leiden University. This work is
presented as a preliminary version of the keynote address that was given at the
November 2017 Symposium, Jus Post Bellum: Justice After the War, at the
University of Minnesota Law School which focused on transitional justice.
Feedback from the esteemed faculty of the Grotius Centre for International
Legal Studies has proven invaluable, including feedback from Carsten Stahn,
Larissa van den Herik, Eric de Brabandere, Joe Powderly, Niels Blokker, Kees
Waaldijk, Catherine Harwood, Gelijn Molier, Cale Davis, and Giulia Pinzauti.
Thanks also to Katherine Orlovsky and to the Editors and Staff at the
Minnesota Journal of International Law for their kind assistance and patience.
All errors are the responsibility of the author.
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An honest discussion of what is required to create the desired
situation post bellum can generate internal and allied pressure
to avoid the use of force in the first place. A clear explanation of
the aims of the use of force may also improve rules of engagement
so that specific targeting decisions and other decisions prioritize
the construction of a just and sustainable peace. A more
forthright and comprehensive formulation and disclosure of war
aims should be demanded from the outset and throughout any
ongoing series of decisions to use force.
I. INTRODUCTION
A. THE BRIDGE
Imagine targeting a bridge. Destroying the bridge provides
a military advantage, and it can be done in a manner that no one
is likely to be hurt or killed, but destroying the bridge may make
the just and sustainable ending of the armed conflict more
difficult.1 The bridge literally and historically connects two
communities. Its destruction will cause enduring resentment.
How do we make the decision whether to destroy the bridge?
The jus in bello2 proportionality assessment is notoriously
difficult to make—how exactly does one compare the apples of
military necessity to the oranges of civilian lives and suffering?
If destroying a bridge would be part of the first responsive act
that would start armed conflict between a state or armed group,
how should the jus ad bellum proportionality requirement be
analyzed? Should the assessment of the value of the bridge be
limited to its intrinsic value (e.g., price for replacement, cultural
value, suffering caused by its destruction)? Or should there be a
particular consideration of its role in maximizing the possibility
of a successful transition to a just and sustainable peace?
This article assesses broad themes and is based in part on a
grand tradition, the just war tradition, that spans many

1. See e.g., Prosecutor v. Prlić et al., Case no. IT-04-74-T, Judgment (Int’l
Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia May 29, 2013), http://www.icty.org/
case/prlic/4 (describing Mostar Bridge which arguably fits this model, but not
implying any criminal liability attributable to specific instances).
2. During much of the twentieth century, the law applicable to armed
conflict was typically divided into two parts, the first governing resort to force
(jus ad bellum), and the second the conduct within the conflict (jus in bello).
More recently, jus post bellum has often been included to make a tripartite
analysis.
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centuries and countless wars, but it is useful to begin with this
limited hypothetical. There are numbers of specific criteria that
can be applied to the firing of a single mortar—whether the order
to fire violates international humanitarian law; whether the
order to fire violates international criminal law; whether it is an
act of aggression; whether such an order is so manifestly illegal
it must be disobeyed; whether it follows the domestic law binding
on the actors; whether it follows the terms of engagement;
whether it is unethical; whether it is good policy; whether there
is sufficient warning to civilians; whether it is properly timed;
whether the method minimizes civilian harm; whether there are
alternatives; whether the subsequent conduct minimizes civilian
harm and maximizes war aims. But at the end of any
assessment, the bridge will either remain standing or tumble
into the gorge. Stacked against the concrete realities of the use
of force, discussing the honesty surrounding war aims may seem
trivial. But changing how war is discussed before the first
mortar is fired may not only prevent the use of armed force
sometimes, but also change how armed conflict is fought, and
how peace is built.
This work is as much about the public, forthright analysis
(or lack thereof) that surrounds such a targeting decision as it is
about the direct, classic analysis of the legality of the resulting
destruction. Should the entity targeting the bridge be required
to declare the rationale justifying the use of force? Most analyses
of conduct such as this rightly focus on the conduct itself, not the
public proclamations or justifications by those who decide
whether and how to use force. Jus ad bellum and jus in bello
analyses are generally objective evaluations of conduct. The
existence of an armed conflict typically does not depend on the
public statements of states.3 States may not declare war, or may
actively deny the existence of an armed conflict, but nonetheless
be in an armed conflict based on an objective analysis of relevant

3. See Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded
and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3114, 75 U.N.T.S.
31 [hereinafter Geneva Convention I]; Convention for the Amelioration of the
Condition of Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea,
Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3217, 75 U.N.T.S. 85 [hereinafter Geneva Convention
II]; Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War art. 2,
Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135 [hereinafter Geneva Convention
III] (granting applicability of the Conventions even if a state of war is not
recognized by a party to the armed conflict); Geneva Convention Relative to the
Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75
U.N.T.S. 287 [hereinafter Geneva Convention IV].
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conduct. That said, this work will argue that in order to better
restrain the general use of force, to wage armed conflict
specifically, and more importantly, to improve any eventual
transition from armed conflict to peace, a more forthright and
comprehensive formulation and disclosure of war aims should be
demanded from the outset and throughout any ongoing series of
decisions to use force.
B. INTRODUCING THE CONCEPTS
How would one normally address the legal questions
surrounding the potential use of armed force against a bridge as
described above? The answer is not with the goals of the use of
force, but with the legal justification for the use of force.
Regardless of what is declared as the ultimate goal, an
international or military lawyer is likely to ask first whether or
not destroying the bridge is objectively justified by self-defense.
In contemporary law, the legality of the use of armed force often
comes down to, in one sense or another, whether it can be
justified by self-defense, or in the alternative, whether the
United Nations (“U.N.”) Security Council can authorize the
action.4 This is most obvious in the interaction between Articles
2.4 and 51 of the UN Charter5 in the case of the use of force by
one state in response to an armed attack by another state, but it
informs all discussions of the use of force. Perhaps the
destruction of the bridge is an instance of collective self-defense,
where many states may respond to an armed attack upon one
state, but the core requirement of an attack on at least one state
still remains. Or perhaps it is a use of force explicitly authorized
by the U.N. Security Council—in which case the Council may be
acting in essence on behalf of the sovereign state of Kuwait or
the people of Libya,6 but the rationale is still at some level
responsive, rooted in defense against aggression or atrocity.
With respect to jus in bello assessments, the question of whether
destroying a bridge is justified by military necessity is not as
directly tied to self-defense as the jus ad bellum analysis. That
said, the definition of what is included in a legitimate military
4. See U.N. Charter art. 51.
5. See id. art. 2, ¶ 4, 51.
6. This is not intended to elide the substantial differences between defense
of a sovereign state and an internal population, but here the commonality is
emphasized to contrast this example with the previous variety of just causes for
war.
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aim is not unrelated to the question of jus ad bellum
proportionality, so the overall question of self-defense may have
repercussions with jus in bello analysis as well. If self-defense is
always the final destination of the legal explanation, one might
reasonably say that there is little to discuss beyond the assertion
of the armed attack or resolution authorizing the use of force. If
the only concern is legal authority and no further normative
basis for the use of force or commitment to a successful eventual
transition from an armed conflict is necessary, there may be
little apparent reason to require any further formulation and
disclosure of the goals of the use of force.
This was not always the case. The goals of the use of force
and the legal justification for the use of force were once diverse,
largely the same, and in any case required articulation. As
historians of international law have well understood,7 selfdefense was only one of many legitimate justifications for resort
to the use of force before the revolution in jus ad bellum during
the first half of the twentieth century (making it largely a body
of law contra bellum, thus causing many to replace one Latin
neoterism (jus ad bellum) with another (jus contra bellum)).
Academia has recently highlighted this revolution, thanks to
The Internationalists,8 and more broadly in a forthcoming work,
War Manifestos.9 War Manifestos documents that the declared
justifications for war included not only self-defense (still the
most common justification), but also violation of treaty
obligations, tortious wrongs, violations of the laws of war,
protecting the balance of power, religious claims, protection of
trade interests, humanitarian protection, protection of
diplomatic relations, debt collection, and declarations of
independence.10 Oona A. Hathaway and Scott Shapiro, coauthors in both War Manifestos and The Internationalists, want
to underline the historicity, contingency, and potential
reversibility of the accomplishment of restricting the legal use of
force to instances of self-defense, U.N. Security Council
7. See, e.g., FREDERICK H. RUSSELL, THE JUST WAR IN THE MIDDLE AGES
128 (Cambridge Univ. Press 1975); David Luban, War as Punishment, 39 PHIL.
& PUB. AFF. 299, 299 (2011).
8. OONA A. HATHAWAY & SCOTT J. SHAPIRO, THE INTERNATIONALISTS:
HOW A RADICAL PLAN TO OUTLAW WAR REMADE THE WORLD (2017).
9. See Oona A. Hathaway et al., War Manifestos, 85 U. CHI. L. REV.
(forthcoming 2018) (showcasing a remarkable effort to document the
justification of war through the analysis of hundreds of years’ worth of war
manifestos), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3037538.
10. See id.
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authorization, or with permission of the territorial state. Their
scholarship is a celebration of an underrated accomplishment,
but more pointedly a warning against the squandering of the
inheritance of a world order founded in large part on the
prohibition of acquisition of territory by force and more generally
on the restrictions on the use of force.
Other scholars emphasize the same restriction of legitimate
grounds for the use of force as a problem rather than an
accomplishment. Gabriella Blum in Prizeless Wars emphasizes
that a number of areas of jus ad bellum remain unclear, and
places blame for this in part on the restriction on the ability of
legal discourse to enunciate reasons for the use of force other
than self-defense, without fully defining the scope and meaning
of self-defense.11 Other scholars (mostly from the United States
and United Kingdom, whose governments are also supportive of
a changed interpretation) are also pushing back against jus
contra bellum, particularly with respect to “humanitarian
intervention” 12 or use of force under the “Responsibility to
Protect” doctrine.13
Can these views be bridged? Can we learn anything about
the overall body of law and ethics that apply to matters of war
and peace (including jus post bellum) from this new interest in
stated war aims by Blum14 and from the remarkable research
11. Gabriella Blum, Prizeless Wars, Invisible Victories: The Modern Goals
of Armed Conflict, 49 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 633, 688 (2017).
12. See, e.g., U.K. GOV’T PRIME MINISTER’S OFFICE, CHEMICAL WEAPON USE
BY SYRIAN REGIME: UK GOVERNMENT LEGAL POSITION (Aug. 29, 2013),
https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/chemical-weapon-use-by-syrianregime-uk-government-legal-position/chemical-weapon-use-by-syrian-regimeuk-government-legal-position-html-version; Steven R. Ratner, Jus ad Bellum
and Jus in Bello After September 11, 96 AM. J. INT’L L. 905 (2002); Jane E.
Stromseth, Law and Force After Iraq: A Transitional Moment, 97 AM. J. INT’L
L. 628 (2003); Jane E. Stromseth, New Paradigms for the Jus Ad Bellum? 38
GEO. WASH. INT’L L. REV. 561 (2006); Daniel Bethlehem, Stepping Back a
Moment – The Legal Basis in Favour of a Principle of Humanitarian
Intervention, EJIL: TALK! (Sep. 12, 2013), http://www.ejiltalk.org/steppingback-a-moment-the-legal-basis-in-favour-of-a-principle-of-humanitarianintervention/.
13. See INT’L COMM’N ON INTERVENTION AND STATE SOVEREIGNTY, THE
RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT: REPORT OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION ON
INTERVENTION AND STATE SOVEREIGNTY 39-45 (2001). See also G.A. Res. 60/1,
2005 World Summit Outcome, ¶ 138-39 (Sept.15, 2005); U.N. SecretaryGeneral, Implementing the Responsibility to Protect: Rep. of the SecretaryGeneral, ¶ 48, U.N. Doc. A/63/677 (Jan. 12, 2009); U.N. Secretary-General’s
High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change, A More Secure World:
Our Shared Responsibility, ¶ 65-7, U.N. Doc. A/59/565 (Nov. 29, 2004).
14. See Blum, supra note 11, at 688.
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project described in War Manifestos, or is it best addressed only
through jus contra bellum? 15 It is worth noting that the uses of
force since the end of the Cold War that arguably or clearly
violate jus contra bellum have not ended in a clear transition to
a just and sustainable peace.16 If they did not begin well, they
often did not end well. Whether one focuses on Kosovo,
Afghanistan, Iraq, Libya, Ukraine, Syria, or elsewhere, it is
often hard to tie a clear expression of war aims to a clear
accomplishment of those goals. Not only are the current
restrictions on jus ad bellum effectively at risk of being
disregarded—a view shared by all of the authors cited so far,
albeit for different reasons—but in practical terms, there is little
evidence that states are improving their ability to use force to
accomplish clear and justifiable aims.
By design, questions of jus ad bellum and jus in bello are
separated by a firm wall. The laws of armed conflict (jus in bello)
may not be violated even if fighting a perfectly legal and justified
war of self-defense. Similarly, no amount of respecting the laws
of armed conflict will lessen the wrongfulness of a use of armed
force in violation of the law articulated in U.N. Charter 2.4
(judged pursuant to jus ad bellum).17 But this way of dividing
our thinking of war and peace tends to miss connections that run
through different areas of law pertaining to war and peace, what
was once discussed as jure belli ac pacis.18 While the views of
various authors are very unlikely to be reconciled, perhaps the
path to drawing the best lessons from these conflicting views
also requires bridging the various areas of just war theory
separated during the twentieth century but subject to renewed
interest in recent decades with special emphasis in the law of
transition between armed conflict and a just and sustainable
peace, which some call jus post bellum.19

15. See Hathaway et al., supra note 9.
16. See, e.g., Jens Iverson, Transitional Justice, Jus Post Bellum and
International Criminal Law: Differentiating the Usages, History and Dynamics,
7 INT’L J. TRANSITIONAL JUST. 413 (2013).
17. U.N. Charter art. 2, ¶ 4
18. HUGO GROTIUS, LIBRI TRES DE JURE BELLI AC PACIS, IN QUIBUS IUS
NATURAE ET GENTIUM, ITEM IURIS PUBLICI PRAECIPUA EXPLICANTUR (Francis W.
Kelsey et al. trans., Clarendon Press 1925) (1625) (Latin for the Laws of War
and Peace).
19. Iverson, supra note 16.
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C. ARGUMENT AND DEFINITIONS

This work argues that an honest articulation of war aims
matters. By “honest,” I mean a reasonable level of forthright and
comprehensive public expression by the state considering the
use of force. By “war aims,” I mean the actual intentions of those
individuals and entities that choose whether or not to use force,
regardless of whether that use of force would amount to armed
conflict or state of war. By “matters,” I mean that whether or not
something has legal, normative, and practical implications.
In particular, this work makes the case that requiring the
articulation of the goals of the use of force could aid in the
successful transition from armed conflict to a just and
sustainable peace when armed conflict does occur. By
“improving the discussion,” I mean both the honest, internal
debate within open societies where public support is likely to be
necessary for the sustained commitment of resources if war aims
extend beyond symbolic action and the public, forthright
publication of the actual rationale for and goals of the use of
force. By “successful transition from armed conflict to a just and
sustainable peace,” I mean not merely the full cessation of
hostilities, but rather the aim of a just peace unlikely to return
to armed conflict over the same dispute, as has been the focus of
the just war theory throughout its existence.
As Larry May and Elizabeth Edenberg put it:
It is not merely peace that is at issue, but a just peace,
where mutual respect and the rule of law are key
considerations . . . .The jus post bellum literature
focuses, as one might expect, on the achieving of
peace . . . .While jus post bellum theorists want a just
peace, not merely any peaceful settlement of hostilities,
they focus on the stopping of hostilities . . . .Jus post
bellum principles all are aimed at securing a just and
lasting peace at the end of war or armed conflict.
Discussion of these principles has been standard fare in
the Just War Tradition for several thousand years, even
if jus post bellum principles are not usually given the
status afforded to jus ad bellum and jus in bello
principles.20

20. Larry May & Elizabeth Edenberg, Introduction, in JUS POST BELLUM
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Recognition that the application of law in this area has, as
May and Edenberg state, the aim of a just and lasting peace (and
is not neutral with the application to these normative goals) is
necessary for understanding and development of jus post
bellum.21 Another way to frame the normative emphasis on a
“just and sustainable peace” so often referenced in the literature
of jus post bellum is to tie it to concepts from peace studies such
as Johan Galtung’s “positive peace” being differentiated from a
mere “negative” peace,22 without a just resolution of the causes
of the war and conduct within the war.
This work asserts that an honest discussion of war aims
matters not only for jus post bellum, but for jus ad bellum and
jus in bello as well. As described in War Manifestos,23 a clear
statement of war aims has historically allowed the possibility of
avoiding war due to settlement. In contemporary jus contra
bellum, this should obviously function differently. Rather than
threatening aggressive war, an honest discussion of what is
required to create the desired end state may help generate
internal and allied pressure to avoid the use of force in the first
place. A clear explanation of the envisioned overall aims of the
use of force may also improve rules of engagement so that
specific targeting decisions and other decisions more firmly
prioritize the eventual construction of a just and sustainable
peace.
D. ROADMAP
This work will proceed as follows. The roots of the law on
declarations of war and peacemaking will be examined in Part
II, with a particular eye towards customary international law,
as it existed before the twentieth century, focusing on the works

AND TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE 1–3 (Larry May & Elizabeth Edenberg eds.,
Cambridge Univ. Press 2013).
21. This section, as well as certain writing on Vattel and jus post bellum,
builds in part upon unpublished work of the author.
22. The concepts of “positive” peace were developed by Johan Galtung in
his seminal 1964 article: Johan Galtung, An Editorial, 1 J. PEACE RES. 1 (1964).
For more on Galtung’s work on structural analysis of peace, see also Johan
Galtung, Cultural Violence, 27 J. PEACE RES. 291 (1990); Johan Galtung, Social
Cosmology and the Concept of Peace, 18 J. PEACE RES. 183 (1981); Johan
Galtung, Twenty-Five Years of Peace Research: Ten Challenges and Some
Responses, 22 J. PEACE RES. 141 (1985); Johan Galtung, Violence, Peace and
Peace Research, 6 J. PEACE RES. 167 (1969);
23. Hathaway et al., supra note 9.
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of Emer de Vattel. Part III will provide further context for the
current tripartite structure (jus ad/contra bellum, jus in bello,
and jus post bellum) commonly used to evaluate the laws and
norms pertaining to the use of force, conduct within armed
conflict, and the transition from armed conflict to peace. After
this initial grounding in the past and present norms regarding
war aims and the transition to peace, the current discussion
regarding the restrictive nature of jus contra bellum and how
that relates to war aims is re-introduced in Part IV. Part V
extends this discussion to examine how a public and forthright
declaration of the aims of the use of force may be connected to
the successful transition to a just and sustainable peace in six
recent conflicts, namely Kuwait, Kosovo, Afghanistan, Iraq,
Libya, and Ukraine. In the conclusion, a discussion of the
uncertain future of the laws of war and peace is provided.
II. DECLARATIONS OF WAR AND PEACEMAKING
BEFORE JUS CONTRA BELLUM
The idea that war aims should be stated is ancient.24 The
earliest relevant example is the Roman practice limiting warfare
of demanding redress formally through a repetio rerum.25 This
diplomatic document would list the wrongs allegedly done and
the conduct needed to satisfy Rome.26 After thirty-three days, if
satisfaction had not been obtained, the next step was legal
authorization in the name of the Senate and the people of
Rome.27 Only then would the fetial priests issue a formal
declaration of war, and military measures could commence.28

24. This section builds upon the author’s Ph.D. thesis The Function of Jus
Post Bellum in International Law. This study focuses on legal and normative
principles of the transition from armed conflict to peace, often called jus post
bellum. It does not focus on declarations of war, but does address the deep roots
of jus post bellum, including Emer de Vattel’s writings.
25. JAMES TURNER JOHNSON, JUST WAR TRADITION AND THE RESTRAINT OF
WAR: A MORAL AND HISTORICAL INQUIRY 153–54 (Princeton Univ. Press 1981).
26. Id. at 154.
27. Id.
28. Id.
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Emer de Vattel’s29 Le Droit des Gens, ou Principes de la Loi
Naturelle, appliqués à la Conduite et aux Affaires des Nations et
des Souverains30 is a classic of international law. Emmanuelle
Jouannet has gone so far as to consider Vattel a principal
founder of modern international law.31 Randall Lessafer places
Vattel (along with his intellectual muse Christian Wolff) as the
leading voice on the law of peace treaties in the seventeenth and
eighteenth centuries.32 As pointed out in War Manifestos, Emer
de Vattel noted that war declarations were “the constant
practice among the powers of Europe.” 33 He states that:
In order to be justifiable in taking up arms, it is
necessary—1. That we have a just cause of complaint. 2.
That a reasonable satisfaction have been denied us. 3.
The ruler of the nation, as we have observed, ought
maturely to consider whether it be for the advantage of
the state to prosecute his right by force of arms. But all
this is not sufficient. As it is possible that the present
fear of our arms may make an impression on the mind of
our adversary, and induce him to do us justice, we owe
this farther regard to humanity, and especially to the
lives and peace of the subjects, to declare to the unjust
nation, or its chief, that we are at length going to have
recourse to the last remedy, and make use of open force
for the purpose of bringing him to reason. This is called
declaring war.34
Vattel makes clear that the war aims must be made
publicly. Notice to the state against whom the declaration is
made is demanded by “natural law” but custom goes further,
requiring publication domestically and abroad.
29. Vattel was christened “Emer.” Some authors have mistakenly given
him a German name, “Emerich.” See Introduction in EMER DE VATTEL, THE LAW
OF NATIONS, OR, PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF NATURE, APPLIED TO THE
CONDUCT AND AFFAIRS OF NATIONS AND SOVEREIGNS, WITH THREE EARLY
ESSAYS ON THE ORIGIN AND NATURE OF NATURAL LAW AND ON LUXURY (Béla
Kapossy & Richard Whitmore eds., Indianapolis: Liberty Fund 2008) (1758).
30. Id.
31. EMMANUELLE JOUANNET, EMER DE VATTEL ET L’ ÉMERGENCE
DOCTRINALE DU DROIT INTERNATIONAL CLASSIQUE (Paris: A Pedone 1998).
32. Id. at 358.
33. See DE VATTEL, supra note 29, at 328 (discussing the necessity of
making war declarations of war under international law). See also Hathaway et
al., supra note 9.
34. See DE VATTEL, supra note 29, at 328.
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It is necessary that the declaration of war be known to the
state against whom it is made. This is all which the natural law
of nations requires. Nevertheless, if custom has introduced
certain formalities in the business, those nations, who, by
adopting the custom, have given their tacit consent to such
formalities, are under an obligation of observing them, as long
as they have not set them aside by a public renunciation (Prelim.
§26). Formerly the powers of Europe used to send heralds or
ambassadors to declare war; at present they content themselves
with publishing the declaration in the capital, in the principal
towns, or on the frontiers: manifestoes are issued; and through
the easy and expeditious channels of communication which the
establishment of posts now affords, the intelligence is soon
spread on every side.35
Besides the foregoing reasons, it is necessary for a nation to
publish the declaration of war for the instruction and direction
of her own subjects, in order to fix the date of the rights which
belong to them from the moment of this declaration, and in
relation to certain effects which the voluntary law of nations
attributes to a war in form. Without such a public declaration of
war, it would, in a treaty of peace, be too difficult to determine
those acts which are to be considered as the effects of war, and
those that each nation may set down as injuries of which she
means to demand reparation.36
This requirement of a public declaration is interesting both
in its rationale and detail. It was not enough for a sovereign or
sovereign government to be internally convinced of the legality
and rightness of using force, but rather it must be, to the degree
feasible, made known not only to an opposing sovereign but the
general public of both nations. This was the customary practice
of states at the time.37 But why? At least in part because the
state preparing to use force must also be preparing for the treaty
of peace that would allow the possibility of a sustainable peace
with the causes of the armed conflict justly resolved. It is worth
noting that there is an exception to the requirement of such a
public declaration: “He who is attacked and only wages defensive
war, needs not to make any hostile declaration,—the state of
warfare being sufficiently ascertained by the enemy’s
declaration or open hostilities.” 38 This will be examined further
35.
36.
37.
38.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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below.
With respect to jus post bellum, as in many areas, Vattel
took Wolff’s work and expanded it into a more comprehensive
treatise on the transition to peace, paying particular attention
to the law applicable to the formation and results of peace
treaties. Vattel was profoundly interested in the connection
between war and peace, not simply treating them as
unconnected bodies of law.
Out of four books in Le Droit des Gens, Vattel devotes an
entire volume to largely to the subject of the transition to peace:
“Of the Restoration of Peace; and of Embassies.” This ultimate
book in Le Droit des Gens begins with a definition of peace as the
natural state of mankind, contra Hobbes.39 Sovereigns were not
free to take the obligation of cultivating peace lightly, but were
bound to it by a “double tie”—as an obligation both to the people
and to foreign nations.40 This restricts the sovereign not only
from “embarking in a war without necessity,” but also from
“persevering in it after the necessity has ceased to exist.”41
Vattel is applying his law “Of the Restoration of Peace”
functionally, before peace starts and during war, not limited by
time. Many of the themes sounded by Vattel are, unsurprisingly,
along the same lines of Wolff. A sovereign “may carry on the
operations of war till he has attained its lawful end, which is, to
procure justice and safety”—showing that the object in mind is
a peace both just and safe (and thus not unsustainable).42 A
treaty of peace is inevitably a compromise, in which the rules of
strict and rigid justice are not observed; otherwise it would be
impossible to ever make peace.43 A peace treaty extinguishes any
grievance that gave rise to war, and creates a reciprocal
obligation to preserve perpetual peace (at least with regards to
that subject).44 Amnesty is implied in all peace treaties, as peace
should extinguish all subjects of discord.45 The focus for Vattel
is clearly establishing a just and sustainable peace.
Randall Lesaffer wrote the best scholarship on Vattel with
respect to the transition from armed conflict to peace in his
contributions to two edited volumes (Vattel’s International Law
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.

Id. at 431.
Id. § 3, at 432.
Id. § 6, at 433.
Id.
Id. § 18, at 438.
Id. § 19, at 439.
Id. § 20, at 439.
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from a XXIst Century Perspective/Le Droit International de
Vattel vu du XXI e Siècle and The Oxford Handbook of the
History of International Law).46 I have no wish to be repetitive
of Lesaffer’s excellent summation, but would like to draw out
certain highlights.47
In A Schoolmaster Abolishing Homework? Vattel on
Peacemaking and Peace Treaties,48 Lesaffer notes that Wolff and
Vattel both emphasized the need for compromise and a lessthan-maximalist approach to just claims in order to achieve
peace. 49 Vattel emphasizes from the outset that there is an
obligation on all nations to cultivate peace.50 Lessafer notes a
peace treaty must resolve the underlying issues that Vattel
identifies: disputes that led to war, the termination of the state
of war, and the organization of and preservation of the peace.51
III.

A NOTE ON LATIN NEOTERISMS AND THE
STRUCTURE OF THE LAW OF WAR AND PEACE

Many lawyers with an introductory familiarity with
contemporary discourse on the regulation of the use of armed
force and the waging of armed conflict will be familiar with the
division between jus ad bellum and jus in bello, and assume that
these terms describe a natural and ancient distinction. This is
wrong. Robert Kolb tentatively credited Josef Kunz with coining
the terms jus ad bellum and jus in bellum in their contemporary
sense in 1934.52 He notes:
46. For more on peace treaties in general, as well as a comprehensive
synopsis of the work of Vattel, including Wolff’s impact on Vattel with respect
to jus post bellum, see, e.g. PEACE TREATIES AND INTERNATIONAL LAW IN
EUROPEAN HISTORY: FROM THE LATE MIDDLE AGES TO WORLD WAR ONE
(Randall Lesaffer, ed., 2004); Randall Lesaffer, The Westphalia Peace Treaties
and the Development of the Tradition of Great European Peace Settlements Prior
to 1648, 18 Grotiana 71 (1997).
47. For a more comprehensive synopsis of the work of Vattel, including
Wolff’s impact on Vattel with respect to jus post bellum, see also VATTEL’S
INTERNATIONAL LAW IN A XXIST CENTURY PERSPECTIVE (Vincent Chetail &
Peter Haggenmacher eds., 2011); THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF THE HISTORY OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW (Bardo Fassbender & Anne Peters eds., 2014).
48. Randall Lesaffer, A Schoolmaster Abolishing Homework? Vattel on
Peacemaking and Peace Treaties, in VATTEL’S INTERNATIONAL LAW FROM A
XXIST CENTURY PERSPECTIVE 353, 359–66 (Vincent Chetail & Peter
Haggenmacher eds., 2011).
49. Id. at 363.
50. Id. at 366.
51. Id. at 369.
52. Robert Kolb, Origin of the Twin Terms Jus ad Bellum/Jus in Bellow,
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The august solemnity of Latin confers on the terms jus ad
helium and jus in bello the misleading appearance of being
centuries old. In fact, these expressions were only coined at the
time of the League of Nations and were rarely used in doctrine
or practice until after the Second World War, in the late 1940s
to be precise.53
Stahn has identified the emergence of the terms in the
1920s,54 with Guiliano Enriques using the term jus ad bellum in
1928.55 If one were to argue for a venerable root of the
distinction, one could look to Christian Wolff, in the 1764 edition
of his Jus Gentium Methodo Scientifica Pertractatum, which
states:
Since hostilities in war are due to the force by which we
pursue our right in war, which consists either in
collecting a debt or imposing a penalty, and therefore all
our right in war is to be determined thereby, the right to
destroy the property of an enemy is not to be determined
otherwise, unless you should wish to assume a thing
which can be assumed only in contravention of the law of
nature, that there is absolutely no place left in war for
justice, which orders us to give each one his right, and
that right in war disappears in mere licence, to which
none can be entitled.56
The italicized text, “right in war” corresponds to the term
“jus in bello” on page 300 of the original Latin text. On the next
page of the original text, Wolff asserts:
The law of nature, which gives us a right to war, gives
also a right against the property of enemies, as far as
that is necessary in waging war; for otherwise the former
right would be useless, if it were not allowable to claim

37 INT’L REV. RED CROSS 553, 561 (1997).
53. Id. at 553.
54. Carsten Stahn, Jus Post Bellum: Mapping the Discipline(s), 23 AM. U.
INT’L L. REV. 311, 311–12 (2008).
55. See Giuliano Enriques, Considerazioni sulla teoria della Guerra nel
diritto Internazionale [Considerations on the Theory of War in International
Law], 7 RIVISTA DI DIRITTO INTERNAZIONALE [R.D.I.] 172 (1928) (It.).
56. 2 CHRISTIAN WOLFF, JUS GENTIUM METHODO SCIENTIFICA
PERTRACTATUM, 426 (James Brown Scott ed., Joseph H. Drake & Francis J.
Hemelt trans., 1934) (emphasis added).
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The translated text “right to war” is in the original text: “jus ad
bellum.”58
What does this tell us about the contemporary usage of the
term? Reviewing the terms as they were used does not indicate
any clear link to the current usage. Nor is there any evidence
that these terms, as used by Wolff, were identified by subsequent
scholars. It is unsurprising that those particular words should
come together in a long book in Latin about international law.
Kolb and Stahn are right in essence—the reason these terms are
used today is not because Wolff used them in the eighteenth
century. They are used, in this author’s view, primarily because
of the need to protect jus in bello from jus ad bellum, to
emphasize that the constraints on the waging of war apply
equally to all belligerents, regardless of the justice or legality of
the overall recourse to the use of force.59
Jus post bellum is self-consciously named in relation to its
sister terms, jus ad bellum and jus in bello—terms that have
been exhaustively developed and theorized since they were
coined in the early–1900s. Jus post bellum, in contrast, is
comparatively under-developed. For jus post bellum, there is no
foundational treaty text equivalent to the Hague Regulations of
189960 and 190761 or the Geneva Conventions of 194962 for jus in

57. Id. at 427 (emphasis added).
58. Id. To the author’s knowledge, other scholars have not identified Wolff’s
early usage of jus ad bellum and jus in bello. That said, this usage is still
interesting with respect to the question of the normative and historical
foundations of jus ad bellum, jus in bello, and their sister term, jus post bellum.
In these passages, Wolff seeks to determine the natural law pertaining to the
right to destroy enemy property and appears to distinguish between justice
during war and the right to go to war. Id. at 426-427.
59. Compare Kolb, supra note 52 (discussing the misleading implication of
jus ad helium and jus in bello being centuries old), and Stahn, supra note 54, at
426–27 (discussing the emergence of the terms in the twentieth century), with
Wolff, supra note 56 (utilizing the terms jus in bello and jus ad bellum in the in
the mid eighteen century).
60. See Hague Convention IV, Declaration III Concerning the Prohibition
of the Use of Expanding Bullets, July 29, 1899, 26 Martens Nouveau Recueil
(ser. 2) 1002 (entered into force Sept. 4, 1900).
61. See Hague Convention IV, Laws and Customs of War on Land, Oct. 18,
1907, 36 Stat. 2277, 3 Martens Nouveau Recueil (ser. 3) 461 (entered into force
Jan. 26, 1910).
62. See Geneva Convention I, supra note 3; Geneva Convention II, supra
note 3; Geneva Convention III, supra note 3; Geneva Convention IV, supra note
3.
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bello or Articles 2 and 51 of the U.N. Charter63 for jus ad bellum.
It is a phrase frequently used without definition, or with little
understanding that others may use the term to mean something
else. It is almost never used with anything approaching a full
exposition of the intellectual history upon which it is built.
Before the scholarship in recent years, the laws and principles
that constitute the jus post bellum were rarely expounded.
Revisiting these terms and allowing for their use without
necessarily cabining one’s analysis to a temporal conception of
the terms allows for consideration of whether conduct ante
bellum can have post bellum effects.
IV.

CURRENT DISCUSSION: THE RESTRICTIVE
CONTRA BELLUM THESIS AND RELAXED
ANTITHESIS

Why were war manifestos useful? In War Manifestos, the
authors identify several reasons. First, it was required by law.64
Second, it served the practical purpose of providing the
possibility of avoiding war by settlement of the stated grievances
informally or in fully-formed peace treaties before armed
conflict.65 Third, a variety of reputational costs are described,
from the conscience of the sovereign,66 to popular domestic
support,67 to support from allies.68 These are all, in essence, jus
ad bellum concerns, dealing with whether or not it was legal and
practical to resort to the use of force. This makes sense given the
current framework by which modern jurists tend to approach
questions of law and peace, with jus ad bellum, jus in bello, and
jus post bellum largely cabined off from one another.
If that is why war manifestos were useful, why is the study
of them useful today? Again, the focus in War Manifestos is
focused on jus ad bellum, in addition to domestic law issues.
Given the horrors of ongoing armed conflict throughout the
period studied, the principal lesson given by the authors of War

63. See U.N. Charter art. 2, ¶ 51.
64. Hathaway et al., supra note 9, at 35. See also DE VATTEL, supra note
29, §55, at 329.
65. See Hathaway et al., supra note 9, at 39–43 (giving the examples of the
Caroline incident and the Nootka crisis). See also id. at 43–45 (giving the
example of the Eden Agreement).
66. Id. at 45.
67. Id. at 48.
68. Id. at 50.
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Manifestos is that the past is a place that is interesting to study,
but one would not want to live there. In a world where the use of
force was not restricted to self-defense, U.N. Security Council
authorization, or permission of the territorial state, but also
included treaty obligations, tortious wrongs, violations of the
laws of war, protecting the balance of power, religious claims,
protection of trade interests, humanitarian protection,
protection of diplomatic relations, debt collection, and
declarations of independence,69 war is inevitably more frequent.
With fewer justifications, there are fewer armed conflicts,
according to their formulation.70 The authors of War Manifestos
seem squarely in favor of a restrictive, modern, orthodox jus
contra bellum.71
In Prizeless Wars, Blum emphasizes the limited allowable
function and results of armed conflict after the U.N. Charter:
The terms of the Charter made it clear that no state could
lawfully gain land or hold onto colonized territories
through force. Wars could no longer function as means of
adjudication or enforcement, be waged for collection of
debt or the punishment of transgressors, or prosecuted
with the goal of converting the religion or beliefs of other
people.72
This is laudable, but Blum continues:
What we have lost is the ability to specify the exact goals
of war, to identify a clear moment of victory when the
goals of war are satisfied and the war has no further
justifiable ground upon which to continue. The broad list
of affirmative goals, resting on a broad list of permissible
justifications, that warring parties were free to pursue in
the pre-Charter era was, to modern eyes, wildly
permissive; but in a sense, it was also restrictive. For
once set, these asserted goals gave warring parties clear
yardsticks for the purpose of the war—for what it could
69. Id. at 52 (listing the causes in the manifesto collection offered by
sovereigns in order of frequency).
70. See generally id. (examining the history and evolution of war
manifestos).
71. See id. at 4, n.1 (“Regardless of the disagreements around the edges,
however, there is a strong consensus that the right to war—the jus ad bellum—
is tightly constrained.”).
72. Blum, supra note 11, at 635.
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and should attempt to achieve. And this, in turn,
indicated when the war had to end.73
Blum’s central thesis is that because the criterion for the use
of force is generally restricted to self-defense, the current
articulation of jus ad bellum falls short.74 While contemporary,
jus contra bellum retains certain requirements of classical just
war jus ad bellum, including:
[L]ast resort (through necessity), proportionality, and
perhaps even legitimate authority (a state government under
the right circumstances or the Security Council). Some other
elements of [just war theory] were largely foregone. Right
intention, for instance, is not an objective requirement of the jus
ad bellum, and as long as there is a justified self-defensive
action, the true intention of the defender is not further
investigated, at least as a formal matter. Similarly, the law does
not require that a defender faces a reasonable chance of success.
75

Blum would widen the discussion of the goals of the use of
armed force to clarify what is meant by self-defense in practice,
stating: “Regime change, democratization, nation-building,
gender equality, even the elimination of each and every member
of an adversary group have all been cited as defensive goals of
recent wars.” 76 Blum’s argument seems to press against the
orthodox jus contra bellum, stating:
Wars can, in the wake of much suffering, be wise or
unwise, profitable or wasteful, and bring about good or
bad outcomes. But none of this matters under the lens of
international law, where self-defense is the only
legitimate paradigm through which all use of force must
be articulated, evaluated, and justified. 77
Likely the foremost liberal internationalist advocating for a
change (although sometimes phrased as a clarification) of jus ad
bellum restrictions on use of force is Harold Hongju Koh.78 In
73. Id. at 636.
74. Id. at 637.
75. Id. at 658.
76. Id. at 641.
77. Id. at 639.
78. See e.g., Harold Hongju Koh, The War Powers and Humanitarian
Intervention, 53 HOUSTON L. REV. 971 (2016).

86

MINNESOTA JOURNAL OF INT'L LAW [Vol. 27:1

one of his most recent works on the same theme, Humanitarian
Intervention: Time for Better Law,79 Koh argues for a
reevaluation of whether unilateral humanitarian intervention is
always per se illegal under international law80 based on a limited
selection of state practice. He identifies the current period as a
lawmaking moment, one in which legitimacy and legality can be
reconciled in order to allow a response to threatened or ongoing
atrocities without losing the benefits of a restrictive jus contra
bellum.81 This is an argument that has again come to the fore
after the April 6, 2017, missile strikes by the United States
government against the Syrian government, an argument that
has replayed almost verbatim from the debate in 2013, when
airstrikes against the Syrian government by the United States
were threatened but not carried out.82 One of the more
illuminating examples of the argument occurred in a four-part
online debate on the subject between Koh and Carsten Stahn,
with Stahn defending the orthodox restrictive jus contra bellum
interpretation of the law.83
Koh may feel that 2017, like 2013, is a moment of particular
lawmaking potential. But the stale nature of the debate on jus
79. Harold Hongju Koh, Humanitarian Intervention: Time for Better Law,
111 AM. J. OF INT’L. L. UNBOUND, 287–91 (2017).
80. Id. Koh also briefly discusses domestic legality of unilateral
humanitarian intervention pursuant to United States law. Id.
81. Id. at 287 (“The time has come for international lawyers to develop a
better rule to evaluate the legality of unilateral humanitarian
intervention . . . .”).
82. See Vito Todeschini & John Louth, Debate Map: Armed Conflict and
Use of Force in Syria, OXFORD PUB. INT’L L., http://opil.ouplaw.com/page/debate
_map_syria/debate-map-use-of-force-against-syria (last visited Oct. 17, 2017)
(providing a useful overview of the debate surrounding the attacks in Syria).
83. Harold Hongju Koh, Syria and the Law of Humanitarian Intervention
(Part II: International Law and the Way Forward), JUST SECURITY (Oct. 2, 2013,
9:00 AM), http://justsecurity.org/2013/10/02/koh-syria-part2/ (last visited Oct.
17, 2016); Harold Hongju Koh, Syria and the Law of Humanitarian Intervention
(Part III – A Reply), JUST SECURITY (Oct. 10, 2013, 11:45 AM),
http://justsecurity.org/2013/10/10/syria-law-humanitarian-intervention-partiii-reply/ (last visited Oct. 17, 2016); Carsten Stahn, On ‘Humanitarian
Intervention’, ‘Lawmaking’ Moments and What the ‘Law Ought to Be’ –
Counseling Caution Against a New ‘Affirmative Defense to Art. 2 (4)’ After Syria,
JURIS,
http://opiniojuris.org/2013/10/08/guest-post-humanitarianOPINIO
intervention-lawmaking-moments-law-counseling-caution-new-affirmative-de/
(last visited Oct. 17, 2016); Carsten Stahn, On Intervention, Narratives of
Progress, Threats of Force and the Virtue of Case-by-Case Assessment – A
Rejoinder to Koh (Part III), OPINIO JURIS, http://opiniojuris.org/2013/10/14/
carsten-stahn-guest-post-intervention-narratives-progress-threats-forcevirtues-case-case-assessment-rejoinder-koh-part-iii/#more-29757 (last visited
Oct. 17, 2016).
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ad bellum provides reason to believe that there is no clear road
ahead for the legal reforms which Koh advocates. Indeed,
questions as to the binding nature of jus ad bellum have been in
constant and increasing circulation since the North Atlantic
Treaty Organization (“NATO”) use of force in Kosovo.84 Nor,
perhaps, are arguments by Stahn, Hathaway, and Shapiro
asserting the importance of celebrating and defending existing
jus contra bellum likely to convince those who see the duty of
international lawyers to create an ethical world public order.85
Koh’s emphases—normative values, connecting law and
policy, and a lawyer’s duty to play a leading and constructive role
in interpreting law—are no accident.86 They are a direct
outgrowth of his long and fruitful engagement with the New
Haven School of International Law. In Koh’s 2007 evaluation of
the New Haven School, he identifies a number of commitments
the school has made, including normative values and connecting
law and policy. 87 He emphasizes that competing schools of
international law such as those espousing a commitment to a
“new sovereigntism” hold a depressing vision of international
lawyers as yes men or scriveners, rather than architects, public
servants, or simply “lawyers as leaders.”88 In Koh’s 2001 An
Uncommon Lawyer, he lovingly recalls examples of lawyers as
“moral actors” who “guide the evolution of legal process with the
application of fundamental values.” 89 In one of the most cited
international law articles of all time, Koh’s 1997 Why Do Nations
Obey International Law, he notes that the New Haven School
“viewed international law as itself a decisionmaking [sic] process
dedicated to a set of normative values” in contrast to “a set of
rules promulgated by a pluralistic community of states, which
creates the context that cabins a political decisionmaking [sic]
84. See, e.g., MICHAEL J. GLENNON, LIMITS OF LAW, PREROGATIVES OF
POWER: INTERVENTIONISM AFTER KOSOVO (1st ed. 2001); Michael J. Glennon,
The Fog of Law: Self-Defense, Inherence, and Incoherence in Article 51 of the
United Nations Charter, 25 HARV. J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 539 (2001).
85. See generally OONA A. HATHAWAY & SCOTT J. SHAPIRO, THE
INTERNATIONALIST: HOW A RADICAL PLAN TO OUTLAW WAR REMADE THE
WORLD (2017) (arguing that attempts to outlaw wars of aggression resulted in
a sustained effort towards peace that is relevant today).
86. This section builds upon the author’s online writings.
87. Harold Hongju Koh, Is There a “New” New Haven School of
International Law? 32 YALE L.J. 559 (2007).
88. Ben W. Heineman, Jr., Lawyers as Leaders, YALE L.J. POCKET PART 266
(2007), https://www.yalelawjournal.org/forum/lawyers-as-leaders.
89. Harold Hongju Koh, An Uncommon Lawyer, 42 HARV. INT’L L.J. 7, 9
(2001).
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process.”90 He also, notably, critiques past failures of the New
Haven School and notes the critiques of others, demonstrating
his own intellectual flexibility. In Koh’s 1995 A World
Transformed, he recalls the 1974 founding of Yale Studies in
World Public Order (which later became the Yale Journal of
International Law) and recalls the demand for an evaluation of
an ethical world public order, refreshed through the decades by
scholars, including Koh himself.91
Someone with this perspective will not be satisfied with a
response that does not allow for the possibility of lawyers to lead
towards a world order that can prevent atrocity crimes—with
the U.N. Security Council if possible, nonviolently if possible, but
without such authorization and with force if necessary. This is
not necessarily calling for radical change, but rather reflects
frustration with the likely impossibility of any profound
structural change under the current U.N. Charter without
reinterpretation, perhaps echoing Edmund Burke’s maxim—”A
state without the means of change is without the means of its
conservation.”92 If international lawyers do not discover a way to
change the international system to prevent atrocity crimes, it
threatens the conservation of the international system itself and
an abdication of duty.93
In contrast, one may turn again to Hathaway and Shapiro
in 2013 reminding the reader of the horrors of history94 or the
simple formulation that regardless of what one wishes the law
must be, the first duty of the lawyer is to present the law as it is.
There are countless other sources in defense of the orthodox
interpretation of U.N. Charter 2.4, but perhaps the most
revealing source in favor of the existence of an orthodox,
restrictive jus contra bellum is Koh himself. After all, if the
current law were sufficient, there would be no need for it to be a
“time for a better law.”

90. Harold Hongju Koh, Why Do Nations Obey International Law, 106 YALE
L.J. 2599, 2623 (1997).
91. Harold Hongju Koh, A World Transformed, 20 YALE J. INT’L L. ix (1995).
92. EDMUND BURKE, REFLECTIONS ON THE REVOLUTION IN FRANCE 23
(1790).
93. See also Jens Iverson, The New Haven School on Syria – Observing
Professors Koh and Stahn, OPINIO JURIS (Oct. 16, 2013, 7:38 AM),
http://opiniojuris.org/2013/10/16/jens-iverson-guest-post-new-haven-schoolsyria-observing-professors-koh-stahn/.
94. Oona A. Hathaway & Scott J. Shapiro, On Syria, a U.N. Vote Isn’t
Optional, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 3, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/09/04/
opinion/on-syria-a-un-vote-isnt-optional.html?hp&_r=0.
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V. MISSING FROM THE DISCUSSION: THE END OF
WAR
A. INTRODUCTION
One issue that could be further developed from the
arguments expressed in War Manifestos and Prizeless Wars, as
well as the general debate on how restrictive jus ad bellum/just
contra bellum is and how restrictive it should be, is the
connection between the expression of war aims and the
transition from armed conflict to a just and sustainable peace.
The research effort that forms the backbone of War Manifestos
is impressive, and should produce a good amount of additional
valuable scholarship. One avenue, of course, is further pairing
the original materials compiled with the publicists of the past,
as well as an understanding that those publicists were working
in a conceptual world that did not as clearly demarcate jus ad
bellum, jus in bello, and jus post bellum in the manner
international lawyers do today. To return to Vattel, he declares
Without such a public declaration of war, it would, in a
treaty of peace, be too difficult to determine those acts which are
to be considered as the effects of war, and those that each nation
may set down as injuries of which she means to demand
reparation. 95
Put in modern terms, the state preparing to use force must
also be preparing for the treaty of peace that would allow the
possibility of a sustainable peace with the causes of the armed
conflict justly resolved. In Vattel’s time, it was recognized that
sovereigns were not free to take the obligation of cultivating
peace lightly, but were bound to it by a “double tie”—as an
obligation both to the people and to foreign nations.96 This
restricts the sovereign not only from “embarking in a war
without necessity,” but also from “persevering in it after the
necessity has ceased to exist.”97 A sovereign “may carry on the
operations of war till he has attained its lawful end, which is, to
procure justice and safety”98—showing that the object in mind is
a peace both just and safe and thus sustainable.

95.
96.
97.
98.

DE VATTEL,

Id. at 432.
Id. at 433.
Id.

supra note 29, at 329.
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As mentioned before, even in Vattel’s time, there was an
exception to the requirement of a public formulation and
declaration of war: “He who is attacked and only wages defensive
war, needs not to make any hostile declaration,—the state of
warfare being sufficiently ascertained by the enemy’s
declaration or open hostilities.”99 One might argue that as the
only allowable use of force under current law is defensive (unless
authorized by the U.N. Security Council or the territorial state),
this limits any requirement to make any public declaration. Of
course, there is a new obligation to make a certain sort of public
declaration, derived not from customary international law but
from the U.N. Charter itself. Article 51 of the Charter says in
pertinent part: “Measures taken by Members in the exercise of
this right of self-defense shall be immediately reported to the
Security Council . . . .”100 Due to the use of “shall,” this is
obligatory and indicative of whether the state honestly believes
the use of force is in self-defense.101
What would contemporary conflicts look like if these historic
customary obligations to disclose war aims were still recognized
in a modern form? This necessarily relies on counterfactuals and
conjectures, but perhaps a cursory look at what can be
reasonably asserted about what happened and where these fell
short might be illuminating. In the following sections, a brief
tour d’horizon will be presented regarding certain uses of force,
namely Kuwait, Kosovo, Afghanistan, Iraq, Libya, and the
Ukraine. Volumes have been written on each of these, and only
a cursory examination will be put forward here. Even this
cursory examination, however, supports the basic argument that
the lack of full and honest discourse about the aims of the use of
force contributed to non-optimal outcomes. In effect, the switch
from a discourse centered on bellum legale rather than bellum
justum102 also limits the discourse and frees the potential user
of force from discussing the full implications of the use of force.
99. Id. at 329.
100. U.N. Charter art. 51.
101. See, e.g., Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua
(Nicar. v. U.S.), Judgment, 1986 I.C.J. Rep. 14, ¶ 200 (June 27) (“[I]f self-defence
is advanced as a justification for measures which would otherwise be in breach
both of the principle of customary international law and of that contained in the
Charter, it is to be expected that the conditions of the Charter should be
respected. Thus, for the purpose of enquiry into the customary law position, the
absence of a report may be one of the factors indicating whether the State in
question was itself convinced that it was acting in self-defence.”).
102. Translated from Latin to “legal war” and “just war,” respectively.
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As noted by Blum, “Right intention, for instance, is not an
objective requirement of the jus ad bellum, and as long as there
is a justified self-defensive action, the true intention of the
defender is not further investigated, at least as a formal matter.
Similarly, the law does not require that a defender faces a
reasonable chance of success.”103 Bringing these historic
requirements back to the fore particularly when interpretations
of self-defense are strained would be a beneficial development.
The implicit assertion made by Blum is that simply
asserting the aim of “self-defense” tells us an insufficient amount
about the full scope of the intentions of the entity using force,
both because of varied potential interpretations of “self-defense”
as well as the varieties of additional aims that may be part of
the eventual peace. One may assert that the legal justification
for the use of force is self-defense and thus the aim is that the
defense be successful, but that leaves the question of whether
the aims also include, as Blum states: “[r]egime change,
democratization, nation-building, gender equality, even the
elimination of each and every member of an adversary group”104
unanswered, even though those goals have also informed recent
uses of force. It is entirely possible for self-defense to be the
principle legal justification for the use of force but invoking that
principle is insufficient to properly explain the aims of the entity
using force, thus depriving all involved of the ability to guide and
measure resulting conduct and outcomes.
B. KUWAIT
The 1990–91 expulsion of Iraqi occupying forces from
Kuwait was, in many ways, an ideal case of collective selfdefense. Authorized by the U.N. Security Council105 and with the
cooperation of the government of Kuwait, 106 the goal was plainly
stated, that: “Iraq withdraw immediately and unconditionally
all its forces to the positions in which they were located on 1

103. Blum, supra note 11, at 658.
104. Id. at 641.
105. S.C. Res. 660 (Aug. 2, 1990); S.C. Res. 678 (Nov. 29, 1990).
106. See, S.C. Res 678, supra note 105 (“Authorizes Member States cooperating with the Government of Kuwait, unless Iraq on or before 15 January
1991 fully implements, as set forth in paragraph 1 above, the foregoing
resolutions, to use all necessary means to uphold and implement resolution 660
(1990) and all subsequent relevant resolutions and to restore international
peace and security in the area . . . .”).
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August 1990 . . . .”107 That clear and simple goal likely limited
the way the armed force was actually used by allied forces acting
pursuant to U.N. Security Council authorization. Regime change
in Iraq, democratization or gender equality in Kuwait, nation
building, elimination of the Iraqi military—none of these goals
were part of the legal rationale, nor part of the apparent intent
of the states involved. Given the overwhelming military victory,
a continued push to change the regime in Iraq might have been
tempting, but it was largely resisted. A tragic deviation from this
general picture was the encouragement of rebellion within Iraq,
resulting in mass atrocities, and paving the way for armed
conflict to return.108 Nonetheless, on the whole, this close match
between clear, limited, and stated goals and results supports the
thesis that clear war aims are helpful in limiting armed conflict
and creating at least the possibility of a just and sustainable
peace. For Kuwait and its people, the result was not entry into a
new millennium of democracy and human rights, but it was the
return of a sustainable peace.109 Mechanisms for post conflict
justice, notably the U.N. Compensation Commission, were
largely successful.110 It would take a new government in the
United States with new war aims to return Iraq to a state of
armed conflict.
C. KOSOVO
The 1999 NATO bombing campaign in Yugoslavia
(“Operation Allied Force”) was the first large-scale military
action by the organization.111 The objective of the intervention
was to end Belgrade’s expulsion of ethnic Albanians from
Kosovo.112 As put by NATO:
As a result of President Milosevic’s sustained policy of
ethnic cleansing, hundreds of thousands of Kosovar people are
seeking refuge in neighbouring countries, particularly in
Albania and the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia. Others
107. S.C. Res. 660, supra note 105.
108. See, e.g., HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, ENDLESS TORMENT: THE 1991
UPRISING IN IRAQ AND ITS AFTERMATH (1992).
109. See, e.g., U.N. GAOR, 70th Sess. (Sept. 29, 2015).
110. See e.g., John R. Crook, The United Nations Compensation
Commission—A New Structure to Enforce State Responsibility, 87 AM. J. INT’L
L. 144, 144–57 (1993).
111. Ruth Wedgwood, NATO’s Campaign in Yugoslavia, 93 AM. J. INT’L L.
828, 828–34 (1999).
112. Id.
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remain in Kosovo, destitute and beyond the reach of
international relief. These people in Kosovo are struggling to
survive under conditions of exhaustion, hunger and desperation.
We will hold President Milosevic and the Belgrade leadership
responsible for the well-being of all civilians in Kosovo.113
NATO made five demands upon the President of Yugoslavia,
namely that he:


ensure a verifiable stop to all military action and
the immediate ending of violence and repression;



ensure the withdrawal from Kosovo of the
military, police and paramilitary forces;



agree to the stationing in Kosovo of an
international military presence;



agree to the unconditional and safe return of all
refugees and displaced persons and unhindered
access to them by humanitarian aid
organisations;



provide credible assurance of his willingness to
work on the basis of the Rambouillet Accords in
the establishment of a political framework
agreement for Kosovo in conformity with
international law and the Charter of the United
Nations. 114

In some respects, this is admirable both in clarity and in
moral intent. At first blush, this successfully creates a
connection between the aims of the use of force and the eventual
results. As self-servingly put by former NATO Secretary General
Javier Solana: “[c]ontrary to widespread criticism, the air
campaign achieved every one of its goals. Having seriously
underestimated allied resolve, Milošević accepted the alliance’s
demands on June 3 . . . .A humanitarian disaster had been
averted. About one million refugees could now return in safety.
113. Press Release, NATO, The Situation in and Around Kosovo, Statement
Issued at the Extraordinary Ministerial Meeting of the North Atlantic Council
held at NATO Headquarters, Brussels; NATO Press Release M-NAC-1(99)51
(Apr. 12, 1999).
114. Id.
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Ethnic cleansing had been reversed.”115
That said, the stated goals of NATO were notably silent in
some areas. What guarantees would be provided for the
ethnically Serb minority in Kosovo? Given the presence of a
separatist rebellion in Kosovo, what goals or guarantees would
NATO provide with respect to the potential independence of
Kosovo or the integrity of the rump Yugoslavia? This failure to
tackle the central underlying issues for the participants in the
existing armed conflict was not without implications for the postconflict settlement. Given that even enthusiasts for NATO’s
mission recognized the extreme uncertainty in its legal basis,116
the failure to provide any clarity as to whether there was any
goal with respect to Kosovo’s potential status as an independent
state not only had implications for positive peace within Kosovo
and between Kosovo and Serbia. Additionally, this likely
provided a basis for Russia to feel that its allies were under
threat from what Russia perceived as NATO’s unspoken, hidden
intentions—with implications for Russia’s use of the veto in the
U.N. Security Council as well as other conduct in the future.
D. AFGHANISTAN
The NATO invasion of Afghanistan following the terrorist
attacks of September 11, 2001, was justified on the basis of
collective self-defense.117 The United States characterized the
acts of terrorism as an armed attack and effectively attributed
them to Afghanistan.118 NATO likewise regarded the attacks as
covered by Article 5 of the Washington Treaty, invoking
collective self-defense.119 The U.N. Security Council recognized
115. Javier Solana, NATO’s Success in Kosovo, 78 FOREIGN AFF. 114, 118
(1999).
116. Wedgwood, supra note 111, at 828–34.
117. Eric P.J. Myjer & Nigel D. White, The Twin Towers Attack: An
Unlimited Right to Self-Defence, 7 J. CONFLICT & SEC. L. 5, 5–17 (2002).
118. Permanent Rep. of U.S. to the U.N., Letter dated Oct. 7, 2001 from the
Permanent Rep. of United States to the United Nations addressed to the
President of the Security Council, U.N. Doc. S/2001/946 (Oct. 7, 2001); Derek
Jinks, State Responsibility for the Acts of Private Armed Groups, 4 CHI. J. INT’L
L. 83, 96(2003).
119. Lord Robertson, Secretary General, NATO, Statement on NATO
Response to Al Qaida Terrorist Attacks (Oct. 2, 2001) http://www.nato.int/
docu/speech/2001/s011002a.htm (“On the basis of this briefing, it has now been
determined that the attack against the United States on 11 September was
directed from abroad and shall therefore be regarded as an action covered by
Article 5 of the Washington Treaty, which states that an armed attack on one
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the gravity of the situation, but the goals identified were notably
less clear than previously with the Iraqi occupation of Kuwait.120
The Security Council called on all states to “bring to justice the
perpetrators, organizers and sponsors of these terrorist attacks”
and stressed that “those responsible for aiding, supporting or
harbouring the perpetrators, organizers and sponsors of these
acts will be held accountable . . . .”121 The war aims of NATO, the
plans for a just and sustainable peace that might be the result
of this action entered into with the legal justification of selfdefense, were unclear. There was no clear public commitment at
the outset to nation building, human rights, gender equity, or
any of the numerous justifications for the ongoing armed conflict
in Afghanistan that trouble the new regime and its allies to this
day. Perhaps if such aims were stated, sufficient resources could
have been invested, the armed conflict could have been fought
with fewer short-term compromises by compromised domestic
actors, and pressure could have been brought to bear on other
states such as Pakistan to cease supporting local insurgencies.
If the goal was a single-minded effort to “bring to justice the
perpetrators, organizers and sponsors of these terrorist attacks”
and hold accountable “those responsible for aiding, supporting
or harbouring the perpetrators, organizers and sponsors” 122 of
the attacks on September 11, 2001, maybe the initial effort to
find high-level Al Qaeda leadership would have been more
successful. Perhaps not. The notorious human rights abuses123
were certainly avoidable, and perhaps would have been avoided
had the plan for peace resulting from stated goals for the use of
force included a robust human rights agenda. But the failure to
establish a just and sustainable peace in Afghanistan following
the invasion at least on a basic level supports the argument that
the lack of clarity as to the honestly declared aims of the United
States was not helpful in establishing a just and sustainable
peace in Afghanistan.

or more of the Allies in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack
against them all.”); see North Atlantic Treaty art. 5, Apr. 4, 1949, 63 Stat. 2241,
34 U.N.T.S. 243.
120. S.C. Res. 1368, ¶ 1 (Sept. 12, 2001).
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. See, e.g., JANE MAYER, THE DARK SIDE: THE INSIDE STORY OF HOW THE
WAR ON TERROR TURNED INTO A WAR ON AMERICAN IDEALS (2009).
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E. IRAQ

The 2003 United States-led invasion and occupation of Iraq
is, in many ways, the mirror image of the multinational effort to
expel the Iraqi army from occupied Kuwait. Whereas in Kuwait,
the effort could be legally justified as an act of collective selfdefense, through U.N. Security Council authorization and for
good measure, at least for conduct in Kuwait, authorization of
the territorial state, the 2003 Iraq invasion could not be
legitimately justified by any of these rationales.124 While in
Kuwait the public goal was clearly stated and appears to have
actually been closely related to the intent of the states using
force, the 2003 Iraq invasion shifted from (before the invasion)
some combination of alleged violation of U.N. Security Council
resolutions, alleged association with terrorist groups, and
alleged development of varied unconventional weapons to (after
the invasion) democratization, regional stabilization, and
human rights.125 While in Kuwait, the factual basis for the legal
justification was unquestionable (the presence of the Iraqi
military in Kuwait), the 2003 invasion turned out to be based
out on false assertions.126 While the goal of expelling the Iraqi
military from Kuwait was accomplished, some of the goals for
the invasion in 2003 could not be accomplished because they
were not based in reality (ending unconventional weapons
programs, ties with terrorists) while others (regional
stabilization and human rights) have thus far been abject
failures. From a disastrous civil war and resultant ethnic
cleansing127 to the Abu Ghraib scandal128 to the ongoing armed
conflict with Daesh,129 as well as the potential of armed conflict
124. See, e.g., Sean D. Murphy, Assessing the Legality of Invading Iraq, 92
GEO. L. J. 173, 184 (2004) (noting the lack of legitimate basis for the United
States’ invasion of Iraq through a comparative analysis of the Kuwait conflict).
125. Id. at 173–75.
126. Id. at 179.
127. Patrick Cockburn, Syria and Iraq: Ethnic Cleansing by Sunni and Shia
Jihadis is Leading to a Partition of the Middle East, THE INDEPENDENT (Dec.
27, 2015), http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/middle-east/syria-andiraq-ethnic-cleansing-by-sunni-and-shia-jihadis-is-leading-to-a-partition-ofthe-middle-a6787731.html.
128. Seymour M. Hersh, Torture at Abu Ghraib: American Soldiers
Brutalized Iraqis. How Far up Does the Responsibility Go?, THE NEW YORKER
(May 10, 2004), https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2004/05/10/torture-atabu-ghraib.
129. Saphora Smith, Fall of ISIS Stronghold Raqqa Will Change War on
Extremists, Not End It, NBC NEWS (Oct. 11, 2017), https://www.nbcnews.com/
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between the central government and the Kurdish minority,130
the invasion did not create a just and sustainable peace
compared with the status quo ante.131
Contrast Vattel’s analysis of what the law requires in these
two instances. Why did the allied nations decide not to
overthrow the Iraqi government in the first instance? The
sovereign allies were not free to take the obligation of cultivating
peace lightly, but were bound to it by a “double tie”—as an
obligation both to the people and to foreign nations.132 This
restricts the sovereign not only from “embarking in a war
without necessity,” but also from “persevering in it after the
necessity has ceased to exist.”133 A sovereign “may carry on the
operations of war till he has attained its lawful end, which is, to
procure justice and safety”134—showing that the object in mind
is a peace both just and safe and thus sustainable. In contrast,
the 2003 invasion failed to provide any sort of realistic
assessment of what the use of force could cost the people of the
countries invading, the people of Iraq, and (in time) the people
of Syria. Nor was there an honest discussion of what the
diversion of resources from Afghanistan would mean for the war
aims there. There was insufficient planning and resourcing to
actually procure justice and safety. The invasion is often
characterized as violating jus contra bellum, but the disastrous
occupation and post-occupation in fact, also prompted a strong
urge to develop what is now called jus post bellum. Vattel’s
approach would not limit the errors of the invasion to discrete
violations of lacking a legal basis for the use of force, but place
the scope of errors both earlier and later. The problems post
bellum did not start when major combat operations ended, but
rather were rooted in the failure to have an honest discussion of
war aims before the invasion began. It also was a devastating

storyline/isis-terror/fall-isis-stronghold-raqqa-will-change-war-extremists-notend-n808621.
130. Maher Chmaytelli, More than 180,000 people, mostly Kurds, displaced
by Iraqi-Kurdish conflict, REUTERS (Nov. 2, 2017), http://www.reuters.com/
article/us-mideast-crisis-iraq-kurds-refugees/more-than-180000-people-mostlykurds-displaced-by-iraqi-kurdish-conflict-idUSKBN1D220A.
131. JOHN NIXON, DEBRIEFING THE PRESIDENT: THE INTERROGATION OF
SADDAM HUSSEIN 222–23 (2016).
132. DE VATTEL, supra note 29, bk. IV, ch. I, § 3.
133. Id. at § 6.
134. Id.
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blow to the reputation of the United States,135 as well as the idea
of humanitarian intervention.
F. LIBYA
The 2011 NATO-led bombing campaign in Libya in some
ways resembles the NATO bombing campaign in Yugoslavia but
with a limited U.N. Security Council mandate. Here, the only
legal bases for the use of force are the relevant U.N. Security
Council resolutions, particularly resolution 1973. U.N. Security
Council Resolution 1973136 listed as an aim to “ensure the
protection of civilians and civilian populated areas and the rapid
and unimpeded passage of humanitarian assistance and the
safety of humanitarian personnel . . . .”137 and authorized states
“to take all necessary measures . . . to protect civilians and
civilian populated areas under threat of attack in the Libyan
Arab Jamahiriya, including Benghazi, while excluding a foreign
occupation force of any form on any part of Libyan
territory . . . .”138 This is a more complex goal than expelling the
Iraqi military from Kuwait, but still a clearer stated aim than in
Kosovo, Afghanistan, or Iraq. It is probably closest to the goal in
Kosovo. The difficulty in Libya, in contrast with Kuwait, is that
the intent revealed by the conduct of the foreign states using
force in Libya is somewhat different than the stated goal of the
U.N. Security Council.139 Rather, the goal of the foreign states
seems to have been regime change pursued by means of
providing air support for a rebellious force. No particular plans
seem to have been in place or implemented to successfully
facilitate a just and sustainable peace post-regime change.
135. See generally Shirley V. Scott & Olivia Ambler, Does Legality Really
Matter? Accounting for the Decline in US Foreign Policy Legitimacy Following
the 2003 Invasion of Iraq, 13 EUR. J. INT’L RELATIONS 67 (explaining that the
United States of America’s legitimacy suffered substantially following the
botched operations in Iraq).
136. S.C. Res. 1973 (Mar. 17, 2011).
137. Id.
138. Id. ¶ 4.
139. See generally Graham Cronogue, Responsibility to Protect: Syria the
Law, Politics, and Future of Humanitarian Intervention Post-Libya, 3 J. INT’L
HUMAN. LEGAL STUD. 124 (comparing the international response to Libya to
that of Syria to show that the same issues of legitimacy will arise with Syria);
Gier Ulfstein & Hege Fosund Christiansen, The Legality of the NATO Bombing
in Libya, 62 INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 159, 172 (2013) (arguing that NATO countries
were seeking regime change, while the U.N. Security Council merely approved
a no-fly zone).
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Having failed to honestly describe and publicly prepare for a
clear vision of a just and sustainable peace, or to limit the use of
force to the stated ends authorized by the relevant authority (in
this case the U.N. Security Council), the post-bellum situation
in Libya has widely been described as disastrous.140 It has also
reinforced the view in Russia, and elsewhere, that authorization
by the U.N. Security Council for limited humanitarian
intervention is likely to be abused in a dishonest fashion.141
G. UKRAINE
Since 2014, Russia has seized control of Ukrainian territory
(Crimea) and supported separatist armed forces in other areas
of Ukraine (Donbass).142 There was no claim of self-defense or
U.N. Security Council authorization for Russian conduct.143
Russia’s legal justification instead appears to rely on
authorization by former government officials, primarily former
President Viktor Yanukovych, the instant recognition of a
Crimea as an independent state, and then immediate ending of
the independence of that state through its purported willing
annexation by Russia.144 This justification lacks merit. Ousted
government officials cannot agree to the dismemberment of the
states they no longer represent. What is particularly striking for
the purposes of this work is not only the flagrancy of the
violation of a jus cogens norm in the form of the first attempted
annexation in Europe since the days of the Molotov–Ribbentrop
Pact, but also the open dishonesty surrounding Russia’s conduct.
While the Russian government at first officially denied seizing
Crimean infrastructure after Yanukovych was deposed but
before “independence,” the government later bragged that this
was done by Russian special forces and created a holiday in their
honor.145 Misinformation appears to be a core part of the
140. See, e.g., HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, WORLD REPORT 2017 403–11 (2017).
141. Ulfstein & Christiansen, supra note 139, at 167.
142. Marissa Mastroianni, Russia Running Rogue: How the Legal
Justifications for Russian Intervention in Georgia and Ukraine Relate the U.N.
Legal Order, 46 SETON HALL L. R. 599, 646–53 (2016).
143. Id.
144. Id.
145. Michael Birnbaum, Putin was surprised at how easily Russia took
control of Crimea, THE WASHINGTON POST (Mar. 15, 2015),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/europe/putin-was-surprised-at-howeasily-russia-took-control-of-crimea/2015/03/15/94b7c82e-c9c1-11e4-bea5b893e7ac3fb3_story.html?utm_term=.404a54ace215.
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intentional strategy of Russia.146
In some respects, Ukraine falls outside the main focus of
this work, or could be argued to be the exception that proves the
rule. The argument that “improving the discussion of war aims
could aid in the successful transition from armed conflict to a
just and sustainable peace when armed conflict does occur” is
mainly intended as an analysis for open societies where public
support is likely to be necessary for the sustained commitment
of resources if war aims extend beyond symbolic action and the
public and forthright publication of the actual rationale for and
goals of the use of force. Most observers would concur that
Russia is not an open society147 and thus does not necessarily
need public support for low-cost commitments, and it is unclear
there is any political cost in Russia for conduct violating
international law in any case.
While it is too early to assess the sustainability of the peace
between Russia, Ukraine, and Russian backed forces, the
prospects are not promising. The grievance of an ongoing
violation of Ukrainian sovereignty looks long-term and
irreconcilable, and the irredentist impulse in the Donbas region
has not been resolved. More fundamentally, the open flouting of
the core norm of the international system in the form of
annexation cannot help but undermine other efforts to restrain
the use of force.
H. CONCLUSION: RESTRICTING WAR AND REDUCING
RECURRENCE
This work clearly is more focused on the limited set of
international armed conflicts, particularly those involving the
United States and Russian militaries since the end of the Cold
War. The hope in this chapter was to take a reasonable set of
prominent and relatively recent examples to test the connection
between an articulation of actual war aims and improving the
transition from armed conflict to peace. Even given that limited
set, it is far from exhaustive. The ongoing interconnected set of
armed conflict in the territory of Syria merits further discussion
146. Letter from Def. Research Dev. Can., to Influence Activities Task
Forces (Nov. 14, 2014) (on file with Defence Research and Development
Canada).
147. For example, Freedom House rates Russia as not free. See Freedom in
the World 2017 Russia Profile, FREEDOM HOUSE (Oct. 20, 2017),
https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2017/russia.
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but is largely set aside in part due to its immense complexity and
unfinished nature. Non-international armed conflicts do not
formally fit within the domain of jus ad bellum/jus contra
bellum, but of course clearly and publicly enunciating the goals
that would create in the eyes of the armed forces in such conflicts
is likely to facilitate the eventual successful resolution of the
conflict, and is in essence part of the lex pacificatoria identified
by Christine Bell.148
The authors of War Manifestos hold up the era of varied
justifications for war as a warning. Blum examines this period
with more nostalgia, as an era of honestly expressed war aims.
As is perhaps evident at this point, I think the authors of War
Manifestos have a stronger point, but Blum’s contribution is also
valuable. The authors of War Manifestos warn that the legal
regime whereby the legal justifications for the use of force are
highly restricted is not natural or inherent, but rather a modern
creation that was constructed and could be lost.149 Blum warns
that there is a disconnect between the actual aims behind the
use of force and the justifications expressed with the limited and
somewhat sterile terminology of self-defense.150 This work has
argued largely in favor of keeping rigorous restraints on the use
of force and the waging of war, but also argues that the goal of a
just and sustainable peace must be firmly fixed when the first
evaluations of potential use of force are made.151 Going beyond
enunciating a basic legal rationale for the use of force and
requiring those who would use force to explain the particular
plan of how the armed conflict would produce a specific set of
desiderata not only may restrain the use of force from being used
at all, but may alter how it is used and what additional policies
are employed during and after the use of force.

148. See, e.g., CHRISTINE BELL, ON THE LAW OF PEACE: PEACE AGREEMENTS
LEX PACIFICATORIA 131–35 (2008); Christine Bell, Peace Agreements:
Their Nature and Legal Status, 100 AM. J. INT’L L. 373 (2006).
149. Compare Hathaway et al., supra note 9, with Blum, supra note
11Error! Bookmark not defined..
150. Id.
151. Id.
AND THE
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VI.

CONCLUSION: THE UNCERTAIN FUTURE OF
JUS PACIS AC BELLI AND THE RETURN OF
THE RES

In 1943, Georg Schwarzenberger’s Jus Pacis Ac Belli noted
that the law regarding law and peace was at that moment
changing and uncertain.152 It was time for better law. War and
peace no longer existed as wholly separate legal regimes but
could also have ambiguous periods of status mixtus153 and the
fundamental shift from justification from war to preservation of
peace (thus reversing Grotius’ formulation of belli ac pacis154 to
pacis ac belli). Koh and others have also suggested that we are
in (or should be in) a time of legal change, but in somewhat the
reverse direction, with the preservation of peace and the
restrictions on the use of force needing an exception in certain
humanitarian situations.155
If Koh is correct, that it is “Time for Better Law,” it is
152. See Georg Schwarzenberger, Jus Pacis Ac Belli? Prolegomena to a
Sociology of International Law, 37 AM. J. INT’L L. 460 (1943).
153. Id. at 470.
154. Grotius, supra note 18.
155. Koh, supra note 78, at 1004; Koh, supra note 79, at 287 (suggesting a
test comprising: (1) If a humanitarian crisis creates consequences significantly
disruptive of the international order—including proliferation of chemical
weapons, massive refugee outflows, and events destabilizing to regional peace
and security—that would likely soon create an imminent threat to the acting
nations (which would give rise to an urgent need to act in individual and
collective self-defense under U.N. Charter Article 51); and (2) a Security Council
resolution were not available because of a persistent veto; and the group of
nations that had persistently sought Security Council action had exhausted all
other remedies reasonably available under the circumstances, they would not
violate U.N. Charter Article 2(4) if they used (3) limited force for genuinely
humanitarian purposes that was necessary and proportionate to address the
imminent threat, would demonstrably improve the humanitarian situation, and
would terminate as soon as the threat is abated. In particular, these nations’
claims that their actions were not wrongful would be strengthened if they could
demonstrate: (4) that the action was collective, e.g., involving the General
Assembly’s Uniting for Peace Resolution or regional arrangements under U.N.
Charter Chapter VIII; (5) that collective action would prevent the use of a per
se illegal means by the territorial state, e.g., deployment of banned chemical
weapons; or (6) would help to avoid a per se illegal end, e.g., genocide, war
crimes, crimes against humanity, or an avertable humanitarian disaster, such
as the widespread slaughter of innocent civilians, for example, another Halabja
or Srebrenica; to be credible, the legal analysis of any particular situation would
need to substantiate each of these factors with persuasive factual evidence of:
(1) Disruptive Consequences likely to lead to Imminent Threat; (2) Exhaustion;
(3) Limited, Necessary, Proportionate, and Humanitarian Use of Force; (4)
Collective Action; (5) Illegal Means; and (6) Avoidance of Illegal Ends). Id.
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unclear after review of recent armed conflicts that the moment
is right for the law to be developed in the manner he suggests.
Trust between major military powers is perhaps lower than at
any time since the Cold War. Instead of a wholesale and
immediate adoption of a standard that would permit the use of
force in the form of humanitarian intervention without the legal
justification of U.N. Security Council authorization, self-defense,
or permission of the territorial state; perhaps first it is time to
revivify obligations with respect to the open and public
declaration as to war aims. At a minimum, embracing a
discourse ethics156 that emphasizes honesty in the face of
sustained efforts to justify the use of force with misinformation
by major military powers seems appropriate.
Even in Vattel’s time, genuine cases of purely and
unequivocally defensive war did not require any public
declaration for response: “He who is attacked and only wages
defensive war, needs not to make any hostile declaration,—the
state of warfare being sufficiently ascertained by the enemy’s
declaration or open hostilities.”157 He continues, “In modern
times, however, the sovereign who is attacked, seldom omits to
declare war in his turn, whether from an idea of dignity, or for
the direction of his subjects.”158 Under current law, “Measures
taken by Members in the exercise of this right of self-defense
shall be immediately reported to the Security Council . . . .”159
This obligation to report to the Security Council, in combination
with the customary international law obligation to declare to the
“unjust nation” the use of force,160 should encourage in
particular with respect to questionable or creative legal
justifications for the use of force an obligation for a full and
forthright disclosure of the aims of the use of force.
Embracing this obligation would be helpful in a number of
respects. It might in some instances avoid the use of force
altogether, as described by War Manifestos161 through the
facilitation of an agreement between states or reconsideration
due to public pressure against the state considering use of force.
This arguably occurred with respect to threatened use of force
156. See also WILLIAM REHG, INSIGHT AND SOLIDARITY: THE DISCOURSE
ETHICS OF JÜRGEN HABERMAS (1994).
157. Vattel, supra note 29, at 503.
158. Id.
159. U.N. Charter art. 51.
160. Vattel, supra note 29, at 502-03.
161. Hathaway et al., supra note 9.
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against Syria during the Obama administration. It may limit the
use of force even if the use of force is not avoided. This arguably
happed during the expulsion of the Iraqi military from Kuwait.
Finally, it may improve the odds of creating a just and
sustainable peace in the aftermath of the use of force. This also
arguably occurred after the expulsion of the Iraqi military from
Kuwait. For the state wishing to justify a colorable but
questionable justification of self-defense, declaration to the U.N.
Security Council may be helpful or necessary to indicate whether
the state honestly believes the use of force is self-defense,162 and
indeed may be helpful legally in terms of any retroactive legal
cover the U.N. Security Council may provide.
More fundamentally, a renewed emphasis on an honest
formulation and disclosure may help restore the trust needed for
any more radical proposal such as Koh’s to be consented to by
states, particularly Russia and China. It would also help restore
the damaged reputation of humanitarian intervention after its
misuse as a post-hoc attempted justification for the invasion of
Iraq in 2003, its misuse to justify regime change in Libya, and
its misuse by Russia in the Ukraine. The honest articulation of
the aims of the use of force has legal, normative, and practical
implications. Particularly before any questionable use of force
occurs, it should be obligatory.
There is a risk of emphasizing the need for an honest
discussion of war aims, namely that such discussion is taken as
a license rather than an additional restriction. It may be an
environment where powerful states and certain jurists are eager
to reinterpret a restrictive jus contra bellum and demand a
rigorous and conservative defense of an orthodox interpretation.
But the risk of thinking anew about revivifying old obligations
to articulate war aims is a risk worth taking. There is much to
gain, as described above. If the current trend of increased
mendacity and disregard for the truth continues (exhibited most
powerfully in the 2003 invasion of Iraq and the ongoing
occupation of Ukraine), the results may be catastrophic.

162. See, e.g., Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua
(Nicar. v. U.S.), Judgment, 1986 I.C.J. Rep. 14 ¶ 200 (June 27) (“[I]f self-defence
is advanced as a justification for measures which would otherwise be in breach
both of the principle of customary international law and of that contained in the
Charter, it is to be expected that the conditions of the Charter should be
respected. Thus for the purpose of enquiry into the customary law position, the
absence of a report may be one of the factors indicating whether the State in
question was itself convinced that it was acting in self-defence.”).
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At the time of this writing, there is a substantial possibility
of an armed conflict between the United States and the
Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (North Korea), as well as
various potential co-belligerents. The United States has declared
“if it is forced to defend itself or its allies, we will have no choice
but to totally destroy North Korea.”163 It is unclear what the
United States government means by being “forced to defend.”
Nor is there a clear, public explanation of how the aim of totally
destroying North Korea will lead to a just and sustainable peace.
Even more than after the 2003 invasion of Iraq, there is no
apparent plan for the hundreds of thousands of casualties such
an armed conflict would likely produce. There has perhaps never
been such a pressing need for a clear explanation from both sides
as to the aims guiding their threatened use of force.
In the Middle Ages, the “Res” or “thing” was the territory,
property, or other object over which the just war was fought, and
was intimately connected to the idea of causa or justa causa
which was the characterization of the res; that is, that it was just
to pursue the res in war, for example, to lawfully recover
territory.164 Under current law governing international armed
conflicts, the prohibition of annexation as the res or indeed any
“use of force against the territorial integrity or political
independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent
with the Purposes of the United Nations”165 means that the
description of a particular res is generally not clearly articulated.
The res reimagined for current uses of force might not always be
a physical thing or territory, but a clear explanation of the
outcomes intended by the use of force. The res in Kuwait was
mainly the territory of Kuwait, the justa causa mainly to
lawfully recover territory, and to the extent that goal guided the
use of force, the use of force was not only legally permissible but
served the goal of creating a just and sustainable peace. With
Kosovo, the res was not a physical thing but the protection of
Kosovars—but as with Libya there was no clearly articulated
vision of how that could be achieved in the long-term and how
that would interact with Yugoslav and Libyan sovereignty.

163. U.N. GAOR, 72d Sess., 3d plen. mtg. at 10, U.N. Doc. A/72/PV.3 (Sept.
19, 2017).
164. The traditional criteria of persona, res, causa, animus and auctoritas
dates from the Apparatus glossarum Laurentii Hispanii in Compilationem
tertiam of Laurentius Hispanus (c. 1180-1248). See also Russell, supra note 7,
at 128.
165. U.N. Charter art. 2, ¶ 4.
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While annexation and interference with the territorial integrity
and political independence remains prohibited, there is a need
for a clear articulation of the res in each instance, particularly if
states are tempted to stretch a conservative interpretation of
self-defense as the legal justification for the use of force.
It is time for a return of the res. Before force is used, there
should be a full explanation of why it must be used. This goes
beyond legal justification to a comprehensive articulation of the
goals behind the use of force and a plan to achieve them. Before
the mortar is fired, it should be made clear why the bridge must
be destroyed, and how it will, one day, be rebuilt.

